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tŚĂƚŝƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ ?dŚĞ “ďĞŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ “ďĞ-ŝŶŐƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ
ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶĂŶĚŝƚƐĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper reflects a critical perspective drawing from phenomenology, especially 
informed by a reading of Heidegger, to enhance and extend appreciation of the need 
ƚŽ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ ?Ɛ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ Žƌ ĚĞůŝŶĞĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚŚŽǁ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ŵŝŐŚƚ ďĞ
undertaken into the accounting phenomenon and related areas. To illustrate and 
clarify argumentation in terms of accounting mobilization and the domain of 
accounting research, the mainstream and strongly positivistic accounting perspective 
adopted in the U.S. is critically assessed. At the same time, we elaborate how much of 
interpretive research (including much of that labelled critical) is also lacking in terms of 
the perspective articulated here. The paper stresses the case for questioning the 
taken-for-granted and conventional. It promotes reflexivity, cautious pragmatism, 
attentiveness to the value of the existing, responsibility to difference and otherness 
and openness to new possibilities as part of a deeper critical orientation.  
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t,d /^ KhEd/E' ? d,  “/E' ? E  “-/E'^ ? K& d, KhEd/E'
PHENOMENON AND ITS CRITICAL APPRECIATION 
 
 “ ?Phenomenology] is as painstaking as the works of Balzac, Proust, Valéry or Cézanne  ? by reason of the 
same kind of attentiveness and wonder, the same demand for awareness, the same will to seize the 
ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚŽƌŽĨŚŝƐƚŽƌǇĂƐƚŚĂƚŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĐŽŵĞƐŝŶƚŽďĞŝŶŐ ? ?
(Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 1999, Foreword, p.XVI) 
INTRODUCTION 
Buddhist philosophy has compared the perspectives and opinions of an age, historically laid 
down and shored up sediment-like, to a full cup of tea: people have to empty the cup, as it 
were, to see things anew or differently, to appreciate the light of wisdom. How, indeed, can 
new ideas emerge if your mind is full of the power of conventions, effectively translated into 
certainties of being and taken-for-granted? How can you make your life a journey if no room is 
left for what experience and new ways of seeing can bring to you? To put it in terms derived 
from Heidegger, how can you understand  “ďĞŝŶŐ ? ?ŝĨǇŽƵ are confined in a narrow appreciation 
ŽĨŝƚ ?ŽŶĞ “ďĞ-ŝŶŐ ? ?/ĨǁĞĐĂŶŶŽƚƚŽƚĂůůǇďƌĞĂŬĨƌŽŵƚŚĞďƵƌĚĞŶŽĨtradition  W and, indeed, we 
constantly risk being consumed by ways of seeing that might be considered a kind of clutter of 
the conventional and taken-for-granted  W we should preserve the faculty of questioning, to 
keep open the possibility of going beyond conventions, the taken-for-granted, developed 
prejudices and the weight of tradition. Following a reading of Heidegger, appreciation of our 
contingent and situated state and trajectory can encourage us to question and perhaps re-
work words, concepts and constructs. 
  
Such reflections resonate across the variety of discursive and interconnected arenas in which 
accounting is a focal phenomenon, whether academic, professional, policy-making, 
organizational or every-day. In this paper, we develop critical appreciation via two focuses. To 
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build and clarify our argumentation, we give attention to the dominant envisioning of 
accounting in mainstream, strongly positivistic U.S. accounting research. If this is a well-
trodden focus, it is very much apposite here. By focusing mainly on the dominant envisioning 
of accounting in U.S. accounting research through our particular critical lens, we are able to 
delineate key aspects of our particular contribution in terms of indicating the constrained 
nature of much accounting research enquiry in contrast with the approach articulated here 
where there is a constant challenging of the very concepts of the research in the context of 
driven and reflexive research activity. At the same time, we reflect an awareness of and 
elaborate the relevance of our problematizing to accounting practices and ideas (including 
accounting education) more generally.  In this regard, we elaborate here on apparent 
deficiencies in some interpretive and critical accounting research. We draw particularly in the 
paper upon a reading of Heidegger in developing our critical appreciation, while we enhance 
argumentation by referring to key influences on Heidegger (notably Husserl) and those for 
whom Heidegger was a major influence (such as Gadamer and Merleau-Ponty). 1 
 
The structure of our paper 
The paper is structured as follows.  We elaborate a critique of the mainstream positivist 
research. And we also give substantive attention to related apparent deficiencies in some 
interpretive and critical research. While prior critique of the mainstream positivist research, 
which has often been articulated in relation to methodological issues, has noted the 
                                                          
1 Heidegger is a key thinker in the history of post-structuralist and postmodern thought as well asbeing 
highly influential for twentieth century philosophy more generally including phenomenology, 
existentialism, hermeneutics and pragmatism (Guignon, 1999 ; see Kolb, 1986). We should however 
acknowledge, as most commentators do, the problematic character of his political associations, even if 
these be seen in terms of the like of realpolitik or naïveté (Heidegger himself referred to his stupidity in 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĞƌĞƚŽ ?  ?ƐĞĞ<Žůď ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?KƵƌ ƌĞĂĚŝŶŐĂŶĚƵƐĂŐĞ ŽĨ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?Ɛ ƚĞǆƚƐŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ
gaining insights for a critical perspective concerned to enhance general social progress and well-being 
and in this regard has affinity with texts such as White (1991) and Kompridis (1994, 2006a,b). We see 
Heidegger being concerned to open up thought, uncovering and un-concealing possibilities (Mulhall, 
2005), while also having significant insights into the responsibility to otherness (White, 1991). 
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ŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐ ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ŽŶ ǁĂǇƐ ŽĨ ƐĞĞŝŶŐ  ?ƐĞĞ ŚƵĂ ?  ? ? ?ď ? ? ƚŚŝƐ ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ
emphasizes that a more reflexive approach to accounting and accounting delineation is called 
for.  We also bring out how some interpretive approaches (including some labelled critical) 
share with mainstream approaches problems in terms of suffering from the clutter of the cup 
of tea whereby key questions are displaced: What is accounting? What might it be? What role 
does it and can it play in society, in our world, today? In the displacement of these basic 
questions there may all too often be an effective acceptance of taken-for-granted and 
dominant conceptions of the accounting phenomenon. And we see in the mainstream 
research but also in some interpretive research a key displacement of the researcher.  
 
We develop our position through mobilising insights from Heidegger to challenge the 
dominance of the narrow and problematic mainstream research and move towards new ways 
ŽĨƐĞĞŝŶŐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐĂŶĚŝƚƐƌŽůĞĂŶĚƌĞǀŝǀŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?ƐƌŽůĞ ŝŶƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? /ĨĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ
can better counter social injustice and environmental degradation and build social and 
environmental well-being it is important and we need a new way of seeing it. We should 
problematize the mind-set of accounting as narrow technical control but at the same time see 
the valuable in current practices. And we need to be responsible to the other. 
 
We go on to extend our critical appreciation, again drawing on a reading of Heidegger, seeking 
to overcome the issues highlighted and promote new ways forward through a suspension of 
prejudices. This is with a view to facilitating authentic encounters in the process of theory 
development. It entails the promotion of a disruptive kind of truth. 
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In concluding, we reflect on implications for accounting and accountability research (and 
beyond) and highlight our particular contribution. We articulate the importance of our reading 
of Heidegger in terms of re-imagining and engaging with as well as researching accounting. 
 
KEY DISPLACEMENT OF THE RESEARCHER IN ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 
 
One dimension that may be referenced in categorising research (see Laughlin, 1995) is the 
degree of prior theorisation. A relatively closed, tightly defined, theoretical position confines 
the researcher to a way of seeing the phenomenon. A relatively open, loosely defined, 
perspective encourages greater reliance on the perceptual powers of the researcher as 
observer (and, in the double hermeneutic, through the perceptual powers of the observed). 
Yet both these approaches in practice can sometimes appear to share the assumption that the 
ŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌ ŝƐ ůĂƌŐĞůǇ ŝƌƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĨĂĐƚƐ ? ĂƌĞ ƐĞĞŶ ƚŽ ĞŵĞƌŐĞ ďǇ
themselves (Laughlin, 1995). Classical science approaches, where research projects are built 
upon a realist ontology and positivist epistemology, haunt accounting research in this regard 
(Tinker et al., 1981; Manicas, 1993; Clarke et al., 1999). While considering reality as socially 
constructed, some interpretive researchers appear to call paradoxically for minimal prompting 
or predisposition - one wonders at times if they are here being rhetorical, trying to match the 
rhetoric of more positivistic research (see Gallhofer and Haslam, 2017). Interpretive 
researchers sometimes appear to want to input into their research analytical categories and 
invariant properties that ostensibly facilitate empirical testing and argumentation that can be 
tested in terms of falsifiability. They thus move somewhat away from that differentiating them 
from the more positivistic researchers, potentially displacing original and legitimate work.  
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Interpretive researchers in reflecting on their traditions have acknowledged such points. 
Ahrens et al. (2008) strongly reflect our argumentation in expressing concern about a lack of 
an independent intellectual identity ĨŽƌǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇƚĞƌŵ ‘ĐƵƌŝŽƐŝƚǇ-ŽƌŝĞŶƚĞĚ ?research. Further, 
for Parker (2008), there is the danger that when interpretive researchers label themselves 
 ‘ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ ?they at the same time reify the centrality of a functionalist ideology that typically 
deploys an economistic quantification. One can add that when some interpretive researchers 
describe or label ƚŚĞŝƌ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ĂƐ  ‘ĞǆƉůŽƌĂƚŽƌǇ ? they undersell its depth and richness and 
illustrate their lack of identity. And, in their vagueness, they again risk perpetuating a doxic 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƚŽƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵ ?ƐŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌƐŽĨ ‘ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ? 
 
Today, then, dominant research traditions sometimes appear to substantially distance the 
researcher from the object to be investigated. This is clear in the artificiality of the positivist 
approach. But while positivists claim to get to the phenomenon through correspondence, 
interpretive research also sometimes appears to claim that phenomena can be mystically 
appropriated through analytical categories. Beyond the sterility of this methodological debate, 
we seek the researcher ?Ɛ emancipation from barriers to understanding so that she can more 
legitimately gain greater proximity or come closer to the phenomenon, to bring her attention 
ƚŽ ǁŚĂƚ WĂƌŬĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ƚĞƌŵƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŵĂŝŶ ŐĂŵĞ ? ?  ‘ĨĂĐƚƐ ? ŶŽƚ ďĞƐŝĞŐĞĚ Ǉ  ‘ĂƌƚĞĨĂĐƚƐ ? ?2 The 
researcher cannot resign or be displaced from the research process: meaning emerges only as 
consciousness is drawn to the focus in research; the phenomenon never shows itself. Research 
is driven activity (Bernstein, 1976).  
 
                                                          
2 Again, we emphasize the agreement of Parker (2008), a leading interpretive researcher, with our 
argumentation here. More generally, we are not denying that many interpretive researchers withhold 
extreme binary-form judgements and advance many of the orientations we espouse here, including 
being influenced by phenomenology. 
 8 
With a phenomenon such as accounting, the driven nature of the activity goes through to the 
basic questions about what accounting and its role is or might be. Accounting may be thought 
ŽĨ ĂƐ ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ĂŶ  ‘ŝŶĨŝŶŝƚĞ ? ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŵĂǇ ďĞ ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚed roughly in terms of onion-like 
layers: a manifestation is only a part or a particularity (see Gallhofer et al., 2015). To put it in 
ƚĞƌŵƐ ĚƌĂǁŶ ĨƌŽŵ ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ǁĞ ĐĂŶ ƚŚŝŶŬ ŽĨ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ ĂƐ  ‘ďĞŝŶŐ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ďĞ-ŝŶŐƐ ? ? Ɛ ďĞŝŶŐ ?
accounting is the totality of its possibilities that yields the possibility of a being of accounting 
reflecting or expressing an authentic way of existing (the goal that we strive towards). Be-ings 
ĂƌĞ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ Žƌ ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ďĞŝŶŐ ? ?   ‘ďĞŝŶŐ ? ŝŶ ŝƚƐ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ
manifestations may be variously displaced, deferred, hidden and held back, entailing the de-
privileŐŝŶŐŽĨƐŽŵĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ‘ďĞ-ŝŶŐƐ ?. The role of the researcher includes going beyond these 
manifestations. This implies that traditions be constantly challenged and not ossified. The 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞƐƵďũƵŐĂƚĞĚďǇ ƚŚĞ  “ƉŚĂůůŽŐŽĐĞŶƚƌŝƐŵ ?ŽĨĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ ƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐŽƌ the 
ĨĂŶƚĂƐǇŽĨĂ “ƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌ ?Žƌ “in-touch-with-the-tastes-of-the-times, haute couture ?ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ĞǀĞŶ
if it enlists an army of allies (Arrington, 2004). ZŽƌƚǇ ƌĞĨĞƌƐ ŚĞƌĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ǀĂůƵĞ ŽĨ  ‘ĞĚŝĨǇŝŶŐ
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? ?ƚŚĂƚ Ž ?ŝƐ ?ĂďŶŽƌŵĂů ?ƚŽƚĂŬĞƵƐŽƵƚŽĨŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐďǇƚŚĞƉŽǁĞƌŽĨƐƚƌĂŶŐĞŶĞƐƐ ?ƚŽĂŝĚ
ƵƐ ŝŶ ďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐ ŶĞǁ ďĞŝŶŐƐ ?  ?ĐŝƚĞĚ ŝŶ ,ŝŶĞƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? Ɖ ?  ? ? ? ? ? In the critique of positivist 
accounting research, but also in other research, these points have been neglected and key 
questions of accounting have been displaced. 
 
How can the ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ? ‘ďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞ ? ?reflecting ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?Ɛ phenomenology of Dasein), not 
succumb to the fallacy of remaining shackled by particular  ‘ďĞ-ŝŶŐƐ ?, and instead  ‘ďĞŝŶŐŽƵƚ-
ŚĞƌĞ ?  ?ƌŚĂƌĚ Ğƚ Ăů ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ĞŵďĂƌŬ ŽŶ the journey of endless moves that better realise the 
ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŽĨ ‘ďĞŝŶŐ ? ?tĞĞůĂďŽƌĂƚĞĂŶĚƚƵƌŶƚŽƚŚŝƐŝŶ the next section. 
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d, “/E' ? ?^^/E ? ? “-/E'^ ? ?^SEIENDE) AND THE ROLE OF DASEIN IN ACOUNTING 
RESEARCH 
 
,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƐSein und Zeit (1986) can be read as suggesting a key insight: in recognizing and 
coming to an understanding of ĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ “ƚŚŝŶŐ ?ǁĞdo not exhaust the possibilities of that 
 “ƚŚŝŶŐ ? ?There are always othĞƌƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐŝŶ ‘ďĞŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚŝŶ ‘ďĞ-ŝŶŐƐ ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚĂ
concern to question or challenge current delineations of phenomena or with openness to such 
questioning.  
 
 ?ĞŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ ?Ğ-ŝŶŐƐ ? 
For Heidegger (1986), what we understand in language is predicated on prior assumptions 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ ŝŶ Ă ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ ŽĨ  “ĚƌŝǀĞŶ ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? ƚŚĂƚ ƐƚĞŵƐ ĨƌŽŵ  “ďĞŝŶŐ-in-the-ǁŽƌůĚ ? P ƐŽ, 
phenomena are in effect understood in a particular way reflecting situatedness. However, in 
our un-reflexive devotion to the conceptual world (Erhard et al. 2015), we are assailed by a 
 “ŵŽŽĚ ? that makes it easier to accept things as they appear or as we know them because 
others have said so. To  “exist ?authentically ? ǁŚŝůĞ ďĞŝŶŐ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ŝŶ  “ĚƌŝǀĞŶ activitǇ ? ? ǁĞ
should turn ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĂƚ  “ŵŽŽĚ ? so as to penetrate the phenomenon. Heidegger stresses the 
need to project ourselves onto possibilities that may be hidden. Being-in-the-world may thus 
be an arrow of projection towards a new possibility, which opens up the world. Heidegger 
describes here Ă ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ƐƵƉĞƌŝŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ďĞŝŶŐ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚ ŝŶ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ
(existence) and being directed towards the world (driven activity).  
 
It is crucial to here appreciate that aŶƵŶĚĞƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ďĞŝŶŐ ?ǁŝůůďĞůĂĐŬŝŶŐ
in terms of its proffering guidance in everyday contexts: it will insufficiently comprehend the 
extent of obscurity and in-determination in our understanding. Yet, for Heidegger, 
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ƉƌĞƐƵƉƉŽƐŝŶŐ ‘ďĞŝŶŐ ?ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞƐĂŶĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŽƌǇŐůŝŵƉƐĞŽĨ ‘ďĞŝŶŐ ? W the possibility of a better 
way of seeing is integral to the philosophy. ŶĚ  ‘ďe-ŝŶŐƐ ? ĂƌĞ ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶĂůůǇ ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚ ŝŶ
relation to the  ‘ďĞŝŶŐ ? PƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞŚĞƌĞ ?ƉĂƌƚůǇƐŝŶĐĞ prejudices that are intermingled in 
current understandings veil the sources of dominant thinking and stand as an obstacle to new 
possibilities and a ďĞƚƚĞƌĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚ ‘ďĞŝŶŐ ? ?,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?As will be explained in the 
next section, the way this tension is managed is what distinguishes the authentic and 
competent from the falling Dasein. 
 
dŚĞ ?ďĞŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ ?ďĞ-ŝŶŐƐ ?ŽĨĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ 
A reading of this in relation to our focal phenomenon indicates a struggle today in terms of 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ  ‘ďĞ-ŝŶŐƐ ? ŽĨ ĂĐĐŽunting (for instance in terms of content and form) and different 
envisaged roles for these accountings (including efforts to build transparency for democratic 
processes). This is actually and potentially. A better accounting, and articulation thereof, may 
here be envisioned. 
 
If we take what may be seen as an accounting that reflects professional and corporate 
accounting practice  W often understood summarily (and somewhat crudely) ĂƐ  ‘ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂů ?
accounting  W we find differing appreciations of its character and different roles ascribed to it or 
envisaged for it. Accounting may, for instance, be understood as a financial representation of 
the stocks and flows of an organisation and as at least potentially a neutral technical 
phenomenon that faithfully represents those flows. Its role may be seen as providing useful 
information for economic decisions (Solomons, 1991a,b). Gallhofer and Haslam (2016) locate 
positive dimensions of conventional accountings and indicate their mutability in relation to 
contextual dynamics. Of course, this is also a theorising that appreciates the negative. The 
need to appreciate the ambivalent character of all accounting actualities and prescriptions 
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 ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƌĞ  ‘ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂů ? ? ƐĞĞ 'ĂůůŚŽĨĞƌet al., 2015) also encompasses a need to 
articulate negative dimensions that indeed substantively dominate in conventional practices 
and visions. 
 
Researchers should question all dimensions of the dominant be-ing to open up to new be-ings 
of accounting. For instance, Merino (1993) points out that the calculation of financial 
accounting profit, whether transformed by adjustments to better reflect principles of financial 
economics or not, can be problematized as a measure of business economic success because 
prices are not natural but administered in a context where competitive forces are somewhat 
inoperable. For instance, the types of capital provided by stakeholders without marketable 
property rights, such as human capital, are not accounted for. It follows that their 
interrelations are excluded from the price system, which limits the power through legitimacy 
of accounting profits calculated as measurements of economic performance. 
 
Many researchers have argued, focusing mainly on conventional varieties of accounting, that 
accouŶƚŝŶŐĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŵŝƌƌŽƌ ‘ǁŚĂƚŝƐ ?ďƵƚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƐ ?ƌĞŝĨŝĞƐĂŶĚůĞŐŝƚŝŵŝǌĞƐƐŽĐŝĂůƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ?dŝŶŬĞƌ ?
1980, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1999; Tinker et al., 1982; Neimark and Tinker, 1986; Chua, 1986b; 
Hines, 1988, 1991). Accounting has been interpreted as a powerful myth or symbol compliant 
in the construction of social reality (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1990; Everett, 2002). It has been 
conceived of as a discourse sustaining, reproducing or transforming wider institutional and 
social structures (Cooper and Sherer, 1984; Hopwood, 2000; Cooper, 2002; Shearer, 2002). It 
may help support an individualistic economic contractual approach to social life. It can thus 
become an instrument in a context of globalisation to enliven a race-to-the-bottom, to 
increase profits for capital, to allow extractive business logics, to demand lower social 
obligations and to tolerate environmental degradation, and indeed to diminish well-being. 
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Sikka (2008) argues that (conventional) accounting can promote the corporate State and its 
destructive culture while creating a reality where a particular variant of capitalism (a particular 
financial capitalism) is the supported configuration of the social order. 
 
Other be-ings of accounting with variety in terms of content and form as well as character and 
role, beyond narrowly conceived conventional accountings, are envisaged in accounting 
research (and in various ways in practice). This includes accounting going beyond the 
calculative (especially in the sense of quantitative) and the financial. For Lavoie (1987), 
accounting has a non-calculative dialogical aspect. In this regard, for instance, accounting has 
ƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůƚŽďĞ ‘ƐŚĂƉĞĚ ?ƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂ ‘ƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ ?ĂďŽƵƚ ?Ğ ?Ő ? ?ƉƌŽĨŝƚ ?ƐĂŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĂŶĚ
indeed as calculation, including alternative calculation), accounting can take many possible 
directions in the public spheres of modern communities. Accounting can inform about and 
make visible a wide range of matters relevant to well-being and thus contribute and make a 
difference to the community (Parker, 2008). This is not only in terms of varieties of social and 
environmental accounting for a wide range of entities or focuses but also through the espousal 
of new strategies such as ecological holism, performative parody and democratic reflexivity 
(Everett, 2004). For Birkin (1996), corporate environmental accounting can re-present people 
and their concerns and re-establish the ethical relation to land, distorted by modernity. 
Accountings can be mobilised and used by civil society organizations to help create a public 
sphere to inform citizens about how human beings, corporations, organizations and nations 
intervene in the natural and social environment and involve citizens in an endeavour for social 
betterment (Gallhofer and Haslam, 2003; Gallhofer et al., 2006; Spence, 2009; Lehman, 2010; 
Gallhofer et al., 2015). Accounting can create and shape new spaces and conversational 
domains (Erhard et al., 2015) in public debate, question the harmful consequences of 
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modernity as it has manifested and suggest new ways of organizing society, e.g. in line with 
more compassionate values. 3 
 
The various accountings so far encountered as actual and potential phenomena in academic 
discourse have parallels in various accounting mobilizations in other arenas. Our concern, 
following on from the above, is to uncover and appreciate these be-ings of accounting and to 
critically explore them. We should be concerned to critically appreciate and challenge all these 
phenomena. While appreciating moves to critique conventional accounting and articulate 
more critical and alternative accountings, we also seek to address senses in which many of the 
diverse accountings so far manifest in theory and practice suffer a lack in terms of insights 
from a reading of Heidegger.  
 
The falling Dasein 
&Žƌ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƚŚĂƚǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŚĞďĞƚƚĞƌŝŶĐŽŶĐĞŝǀŝŶŐĂŶĚƌĞĂůŝƐŝŶŐŶĞǁŽƌĞŵĞƌŐĞŶƚ ‘ďĞ-ŝŶŐƐ ? is 
the remarkable, competent and authentic Dasein ?ƚŚĞ  ‘ĞŶƚŝƚǇǁŚŝĐŚĞĂĐŚŽĨƵƐŝƐŚŝŵƐĞůĨĂŶĚ
which includes inquiring as one of the possibilitŝĞƐ ŽĨ ŝƚƐ ĞŝŶŐ ?  ?,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?  ? ? ? ? ? Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?  /Ĩ
Dasein falls one loses what makes it remarkable, the faculty of questioning: the falling Dasein 
loses this faculty and effectively just accepts in that it becomes no longer itself falling, as it 
were, into the ƚƌĂƉŽĨ ‘ŽŶĞƚŚŝŶŬƐƐƵĐŚĂŶĚƐƵĐŚ ? ?/n its decay, Dasein can lapse into alienation 
and miss its own being, fleeing from inspirational mystery and wonder to take refuge in 
continuing taken-for-granted notions of everyday reality. Dasein can thus come to be flitting 
                                                          
3 In some respects new ways of seeing may involve the re-appropriating of old ways: e.g., among many 
ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉĂƐƚ ?ĞŶƚŚĂŵ ?ƐĞǆƉĂŶƐŝǀĞǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐĂƐĂďƌĂŶĐŚŽĨĞƚŚŝĐĂů
practice (Gallhofer and Haslam, 2003) or the ostensible role of accountings in ancient societies (see Gray 
et al., 1996): ĨŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ŝŶĂŶĐŝĞŶƚĂďǇůŽŶ ?ĂƐĐƌŝďĞ ?ƐĚƵƚŝĞƐǁĞƌĞƚŽƌĞĐŽƌĚĂŶĚĂƵĚŝƚƚƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŽ
ensure compliance with the code of King Hammurabi, reflecting an objective of unifying the Babylonians 
in a just society. 
 
 14 
from one banal everyday object to another. Absorbed by particular narrow utilitarian concerns 
ŝŶĂƐĞƚŽĨ “ǁŽƌůĚůǇ ?ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƐ ?ŝŶĂŶƵŶŵŽǀĞĚĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌƚǇ ?Dasein can become submerged into 
Ă ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ  “ĂƐ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ƚŚŝŶŬ ? ?Shifted from anxiety over what ŝƚ ŝƐ ƚŽ  “ĞǆŝƐƚ ?, to find its own 
authentic path, it wallows in a horizon of imposed understanding whose existence it does not 
suspect given the loss of the faculty of inquiring. Under a silent and reassuring dictatorship of 
 “ǁŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞƚŚŝŶŬ ? ?ŽĨƉĂƌƌŽƚing others, Dasein is detached from its authentic singularity and 
falls into casualness ?/ƚŵĂǇŶŽƚƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞƚŚĂƚŝƚƐ “ďĞ-ŝŶŐ ?ŝƐŽŶůǇŽŶĞĐŚŽƐĞŶƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŚĂƚĐĂŶ
displace other possibilities; it may think it can no longer escape (Heidegger, 1986). 
 
For Heidegger (1986), the interest of Dasein is confined by the power of tradition. Tradition 
becomes very inaccessible, it seeks to claim self-evidence by blocking our vision of the sources 
of its categories and concepts and making us suppose that we do not even have to understand 
the necessity of going back to these sources. 
 
The falling Dasein in accounting research 
Much strongly positivistic accounting research, especially that reflective of conventional 
economic logic, can be analysed in the above terms.4 One can appreciate how a rhetoric of 
tradition is at play in the constitution of ideological effectiveness for such research. Reference 
to its sources, especially its narrative sources, have been erased so that its categories and 
concepts seem natural and ahistorical even while they reflect a specific interpretation of the 
social order - and contribute to maintaining it (Tinker et al., 1982). Mainstream positivistic 
                                                          
4 The implication of our argumentation, we should stress, is not that there is no value in seeking to 
pursue the conventional scientific method. Heidegger actually acknowledges the value of this for certain 
purposes (see also Chua, 1986b). We are seeking to promote more openness to interpretive approaches 
that open up possibilities to study a wide range of under-researched areas vital to accounting and 
society. 
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research is often disseminated by dint of the force of its dissimulation. So many strongly 
positivistic accounting researchers fail to properly perceive their confinement within 
categories and concepts of the ideology of neoclassical economics (Arrington and Schweiker, 
1992; Gray, 1992; Williams, 2004, 2009; Ravenscroft and Williams, 2009; Lehman, 2010). 
Researchers here are somewhat unaware of the blinkered nature of their approach, bounded 
by the tenets of their theoretical framing. From the perspective of this framing, how, for 
instance, can accounting be blamed for not realising its potential beyond this framing? 
 
Under the hegemony of neoclassical economics and its particular individualistic approach, in 
much of such research various dimensions of the world are overlooked: the narrowness of and 
lack in the particular individualistic materialism; the exploitation of human and natural capitals 
by financial capital; ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ?Ɛecology by unchecked production; of women by men; of 
poor by rich; of indigenous by colonisers; of nation state democracies and autonomies by 
supra-national forces. Accounting too is simply accepted in its conventional manifestation. 
Demystifying these dimensions can scarcely be conceptualized from this hegemonic 
perspective. The affiliation of accounting to such demystification and more positively to a 
more holistic notion of emancipatory social betterment (Gallhofer and Haslam, 2017) requires 
ǁŚĂƚZĂǀĞŶƐĐƌŽĨƚĂŶĚtŝůůŝĂŵƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚĞƌŵĂ P “ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůƐŚŝĨƚŝŶƚŚĞĨŽĐƵƐ ?ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚ
discursive practices used tŽ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝǌĞ ?ĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ? ĂŶĚ ƐƉĞĂŬ ĂďŽƵƚ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?  ?ƉƉ ?
774- ? ? ?EĂƌƌŽǁŝŶŐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐĂŶĚŝƚƐƌŽůĞƚŽŽŶĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨŝƚƐ ‘ďĞŝŶŐ ? ?notably an 
ostensibly conventional accounting in the current context, is damaging in overshadowing and 
delimiting how accounting can affect other spheres of human life (Shearer, 2002). 
 
Some critical and interpretive accounting writers in analysing conventional accounting have 
worried about the erasure of alterity so that any subject can act on a world of objects (see 
 16 
Birkin, 1996; Lehman, 1999; Shearer, 2002; Everett, 2002). Such work indicates that when the 
other is denied and objectified through conventional accounting and related processes it 
appears only as an object to at least potentially satisfy thĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?Ɛ ĚĞƐŝƌĞƐ ?  ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ
ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŚĞƌĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶƚŽďƌŝŶŐŽƵƚŚŽǁƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞ  ‘ŽƚŚĞƌ ? ŝƐƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇ
achieved in the pursuit of sovereign private interest, not enhancing responsiveness to the 
community. Shearer (2002, p. 553) sees ƚŚŝƐĂƐďƌŝŶŐŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚĂƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶǁŚĞƌĞďǇ P “ ?the lives 
of people, the existence of non-human life forms, the integrity of ecosystems, and the 
sovereignty of nations all are made subservient to the instrumental pursuit of profit or 
ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞ ŐƌŽǁƚŚ ? ? ŽŶventional accounting is thus seen in the image of an instrument of 
 ‘ ‘ŚŽŵŽĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƵƐ ? ?ƉƵƌƐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŽďũĞĐƚŝĨŝĞĚĨŽƌǁĞĂůƚŚ “ƵƐƵƌƉĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĚƌŝǀĞŶďǇĂŶĂƌƌŽǁĂŶĚ
short-term self-interest, accepting monetary valuations failing to respond to reasonable 
standards of morality (see Tinker, 1985). These concerns about instrumentalist pursuits echo 
,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ  ?Ğ ?Ő ? ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ǁĂǇ ƵŵĂŶƐ ŚĂǀĞ ƐŽƵŐŚƚ ƚŽ ƐĞĐƵƌĞ
power over nature (broadly conceived): extracting from nature and transforming nature into 
an object. Yet, some critical and interpretive accounting writers scarcely redress the control 
orientation and presumptions of their own accounting advocacies, stopping short of 
,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?Ɛ ŵŽƌĞ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ Ă ůŽǀŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝǀĞ ĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂtion, a deep 
awareness beyond technical control (subter).  
 
Parker (2008) effectively highlights the falling of accounting researchers in their sticking to 
tradition. In accounting, argues Parker (2008), there is a veritable tsunami of narrow and 
narrowing research with an absence on the part of its proponents of much self-critique or self-
doubt but tunnel vision towards assembly of pseudo-facts Žƌ “ĂƌƚĞĨĂĐƚƐ ? (see Parker & Roffey, 
1997). The researchers employ categories they inherited in an unreflective way without 
questioning the sources. Subjugated by tradition, researchers are in effect unaware of the 
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possibility of better views through different lenses (Tinker, 1999). Beyond refinement and 
consolidation of their perspective, they by-pass the new and take few risks (Hopper et al., 
2001; Parker, 2001). For Gaffikin (2009), accounting research is largely in an intellectual 
vacuum because it has ignored the crucial need for self-reflection. 
 
In the global context, the dominant approaches to theory development in accounting in effect 
have failed to substantively meet the lived experiences of the empirical realm (Chua, 1986a). 
For Parker and Roffey (1997), we need praxis in research that does not deteriorate into 
theoretical esotericism and create a reality of accounting carried on for its own sake and 
distant from the practical world (see Scapens, 2008; Gaffikin, 2009).  
 
With regard to many varieties of conventional accounting, Macintosh and Shearer (2000) have 
argued that accounting circulates like a simulacrum in a hyperreality  W a self-referential model 
losing touch with a meaningful notion of reality. By epitomizing accounting as a triumph of 
true information, the falling researchers (supra) contribute to a project legitimizing the socio-
political order, which is presented as self-evident and natural while in reality it is pre-ordained, 
contingent and controversial (Cooper, 1980; Tinker, 1988; Tinker and Neimark, 1987; Arrington 
and Francis, 1989, 1993; Baker and Bettner, 1997; Chwastiak, 1999). The conventional 
accounting promoted here predominantly serves narrow interests detrimental to social justice 
and well-being (Williams, 2002; Tinker and Carter, 2003). Such is the dominance of 
conventional accounting in the discourse of practice that alternatives are often constructed so 
as to reflect the convention rather than reflect their potential in a meaningful difference.  
Spence (2009), in this regard, argues that many corporate social accounting failures are rooted 
in close ties to the economic base of society and to neoclassical reasoning.  
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Spence (2009) emphasizes how social and environmental accounting research has expanded 
not so much because of the informational value of social and environmental accounting for 
communities and vis-à-vis a more holistic notion of betterment but more because it is seen as 
a new avenue for bolstering shareholder return - and substantively re-enforcing business-as-
usual. Thus, for Spence (2009), corporate social accounting (in its dominant form, as distinct 
from the radical variants of counter accounting) is counter-productive to the project of 
enhanced democracy, rather playing a role that is counter-progressive and supportive of the 
established order. It closes off potential debate and instead of substantively debunking 
corporate rhetoric it actually maintains ideological autonomy for business and markets. 
Gallhofer and Haslam (2017) retain much of the substance of such argumentation but 
consistent with a less dichotomous and monochromatic reasoning as they see progressive 
actualities and potentialities in all accountings. 
 
tĞ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞ ŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƐŽĐŝĂů ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ ?ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĂǀĞŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ĂŶĚ
practice that have sought to go beyond the conventional (towards more radical variants) also 
typically share with the conventional in a lack from a Heideggerian perspective. In a deeper 
sense, many of these alternative accountings are driven by a calculative thinking and scarcely 
exhibit much caution about such an orientation. Even less do they reflect the Heideggerian call 
to be attentive to the existing and not always take it as given that it has to be controlled for 
our purposes, a notion that in Heidegger reflects a heightened responsibility to otherness. 
 
Gallhofer et al. (2015) and Gallhofer and Haslam (2017) only implicitly acknowledge the 
Heideggerian critique in this regard. The new pragmatist post-Marxist thinking of Gallhofer et 
al. (2015) and Gallhofer and Haslam (2017) indicates the ambivalences, ambiguities and 
complexities of all accountings, from conventional to social/environmental and to counter 
 19 
accounting in a nuanced analysis that reflects a continuum thinking emphasizing relative rather 
than absolute difference. Substantively, their analysis points to various negative (as well as 
positive) features of such accountings and in this sense is consistent with much of the above 
critique. In Gallhofer et al. (2015) and Gallhofer and Haslam (2017), while a cautious 
pragmatism and a concern to respect the other is given emphasis, there is understatement of 
the Heideggerian commitment to the need to be aware of and attend to the value of the 
existing and the other and to problematize in this sense the basic control orientation. 
 
Striving to bracket the notion of control as an at least potentially narrow and excessive 
practice may be seen in terms of engendering a control orientation that is better, deeper and 
more expansive: more holistic; more pragmatic. Thus, we can turn more towards seeing value 
in preserving what we have or some aspect of it. Heideggerian perspectives here are 
sometimes articulated in terms of love, wonder, attentiveness and awareness (Heidegger, 
1977, see also Merleau-Ponty, 1999).  If some may find this to acknowledge too many positives 
ŝŶĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƐǁĂǇŽĨƐĞĞŝŶŐŝƐĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚ a deep responsibility to 
otherness and the more cautious pragmatism that is evident in the more recent critical turns in 
post-structuralist, postmodern and post-Marxist literature, critical turns that have been 
understood to render critical work deeper and more expansive (see Laclau and Mouffe, 1987, 
2001; Butler et al., 2000; Gallhofer and Haslam, 2003, 2016; Gallhofer et al., 2015). In this 
regard, Okrent (1988) and Rorty (1991) articulate senses in which Heidegger may be 
understood as a (reluctant) pragmatist philosopher (see Kolb, 1991). 
 
Dasein and  ?ĚŝƐŽďƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? 
Going beyond the basic control orientation and beyond the conventional, going back to the 
point of origin or departure that led to the conventional, is a challenge. Dasein may be 
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ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ĂůŝĞŶĂƚĞĚ ďǇ ŝƚƐ ĐŽŶĨŝŶĞŵĞŶƚ ŝŶ Ă ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐ  ‘ďĞ-ŝŶŐ ? ? zĞƚ ĂŶǆŝĞƚǇĐĂŶ
here be heightened in the reĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐŝƌƌĞĚƵĐŝďůǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƐŝŶŐƵůĂƌŝƚǇ ?something that 
can serve the estranged Dasein in facilitating its opening up to alternative, radical perspectives 
(Heidegger, 1986; Laclau and Mouffe, 1991; Derrida, 1995). And the sense that nothingness is 
ƚŚĞĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŝƚƐ  “ďĞŝŶŐ ?ĂƐ “ďĞŝŶŐ-towards-ĚĞĂƚŚ ?ŝƐǁŚĂƚŚĞůƉƐĂƐĞŝŶĞƐĐĂƉĞ from the 
casualness that seems to suit it so well. AǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐĐĂŶĞŶŐĞŶĚĞƌ  ‘ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ
problematisation reflecting Dasein ?Ɛ ĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶƚ ĞŶĂĐƚŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ  ‘ĚƌŝǀĞŶ ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? P ƚŚŝƐ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐ
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞŶĚĞƌŝŶŐŽĨĨƌĞƐŚŶĞƐƐƚŽŽƐƐŝĨŝĞĚƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƐƚƌŝƉƉŝŶŐ
ŽĨĨŽĨƚŚĞĐŽĂƚŝŶŐƐŝƚŚĂƐĂĐĐƵŵƵůĂƚĞĚŽǀĞƌƚŝŵĞ ? ?,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? 
 
,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĞůĂďŽƌĂƚĞƐĂŶĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨƚŚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨ ‘ĚŝƐŽďƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?/ŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨŝŶĨůĂƚŝŶŐ
knowledge simply through the continuing of tradition, it is important to make progress on 
problems that have long remained impenetrable: science should subject its basic concepts, 
which have been virtually consigned to oblivion, to a radical overhaul, and shake-up the 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ŝƚ ĞŶƚĞƌƚĂŝŶƐ ǁŝƚŚ ŽďũĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ Ă ŶĞĞĚ ƚŽ  ‘ƐƚĞƉ ďĂĐŬǁĂƌĚƐ ?
(disobstruction) and to go beyond a basis for starting out, established for deduction, that 
amounts to an undemonstrated principle (Heidegger, 1986). This is consistent with returning 
ƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ďĞŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ďĞ-ŝŶŐƐ ?ďĞǇŽŶĚnarrow existing confines (supra).  
 
&Žƌ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚŽĨ ‘ďĞ-ŝŶŐ ?ƐŚould be transcended by, and be informed and guided by, 
 “ďĞŝŶŐ ? (as opened up through questioning). In accounting, this involves appreciation of 
accounting-in-general, that which is not set out in front of us, but which is in the background, 
that which is on the horizon, the encompassing, basic, notion that yields insights for the re-
ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ŽĨ  ‘ďĞ-ŝŶŐƐ ?  ?,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?  ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? dŚŝƐ ŵĂǇ ďĞ ƵŶĚĞƌstood as a return to 
ontology, in Heideggerian terms the phenomenology of Dasein (Heidegger, 1986). 
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PHENOMEEK>K'zE “/E' ? 
 
In Heidegger, phenomenology, embracing a concern to be open to learning from the object, is 
an ontological turn consistent with going back to the point of origin (supra). 
 
[Phenomenology expresses a] ?ŵĂǆŝŵ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚĞĚ ĂƐ  ?dŽ the things 
ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ? /ƚ ŝƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽĂůů ĨƌĞĞ-floating constructions and accidental findings; it is 
opposed to taking over any conceptions which only seem to have been demonstrated; it 
is opposed to those pseudo-ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚƉĂƌĂĚĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂƐ  ?ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ? ?ŽĨƚĞŶĨŽƌ
generations at a time. Yet this maxim, one may rejoin, is abundantly self-evident, and it 
expresses, moreover, the underlying principle of any scientific knowledge whatsoever 
(Heidegger, 1986, p. 54). 
  
Of course, Heidegger does not mean here that the phenomenon shows itself. The 
phenomenon is always something veiled but can be better accessed. And the core of what is 
hidden is that which would disturb the seemingly established and self-ĞǀŝĚĞŶƚ ‘ďĞ-ŝŶŐ ?Žƌ ‘ďĞ-
ŝŶŐƐ ? ?Returning to accounting research, its dominant tendency to a dogmatic acceptance of 
ƚŚĞ ‘ďĞ-ŝŶŐ ?ŽĨĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐĂƐĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚĂƐŶĞƵƚƌĂů (unbiased), with a related presumed 
role, risks naturalizing constructs of economic utility and individualistic economic rationality 
and rendering taken-for-granted constructions as valid such as those articulating the possibility 
ŽĨ ĂŶ  ‘ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ? ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?  ƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ŶĞĞĚƐ ƚŽ ďĞintentionally directed to accounting as a 
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶŝŶĂĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ďĞŝŶŐ ? ?
 
Intentionality 
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Let us turn to Husserl  W of course, a great influence on Heidegger - in exploring this intentional 
direction. Husserl introduced the concept of intentionality borrowed from the psychologist 
Franz Brentano (whose lectures he attended in the winter of 1884-5). Intentionality carries 
consciousness towards its object and in relation to driven activity consciousness seeks to 
become itself by accepting the other. In phenomenology, a consciousness is fundamentally a 
consciousness of something. Meanwhile, the object in its original existence is meaningless. 
When intentionality carries consciousness towards its object, the latter emerges literally as 
meaning for it. This involves or evokes interaction or conjunction between the subject and 
object (see Depraz, 1998) that goes beyond the sterile debate between ontological idealism 
and realism.  
 
Concepts of profit and cost in financial accounting may here illustrate intentionality. Rather 
than raw materials that financial accounting could describe in a neutral way, these concepts 
change every time the accounting storyteller narrates them: for instance, what is paid to 
workers is typically seen as a cost in the capitalistic accounting system but as a profit in the old 
Yugoslavian socialistic accounting system; taxes paid to the State may be considered like costs 
in capitalistic accounting and as profits (or surpluses) in the old Soviet system (Richard, 2000). 
As Shearer (2002) appreciates, we are, in this regard, the stories we tell: by espousing neo-
classical economic theory, we actually build conditions for it that expand its applicability or 
influence towards the whole of human experience; more than that, we transmute the broader 
spectrum of human motivations into instances of self-interested utility maximization as 
everything becomes transaction (see James, 2007).  “CŝǀŝůŝƚǇ ?ŝƐŚĞƌĞƌĞĚƵĐĞĚƚŽƐƵďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŶŐ
questions of justice to questions of private property rights and to markets. Again, the point to 
emphasize is that the researcher should question any taken-for-granted character of the 
researched and thus, for instance, suspend the naïve conception of accounting as neutral: or, 
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under the silent imperialism of a problematic neo-classical economic reasoning, accounting 
may hide or otherwise support perverse priorities and values of the financial capitalistic socio-
political order that contribute to the massive destruction of the social good and nature (see 
McKernan, 2007).  At the same time in and through the discourse one is seeking to appreciate 
the phenomenon and recognise its positive actualities and potentialities (Gallhofer and 
Haslam, 2017). 
 
The epoche (bracketing) or suspending of the natural attitude: effort to suspend prejudices in 
the doing of good research 
,ƵƐƐĞƌů  ? ? ? ? ? ? ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞƐ ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ĂƐ Ă  “ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉůĂƚŝŶŐ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶ ŝŶ ŝƚƐ
context, an initial abstaining from explanation. The epoche or suspension of the natural 
attitude signifies a stopping, interruption or holding back of a naïve attitude to phenomena  W 
an attitude that displaces the possibility of going beyond surface appearance and simple 
explanation  W and also the promoting of an attitude to continuously seek to be open to reality 
beyond the prejudices that one inevitably holds.  
 
dŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚĂƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶ ?Ă “ĚŝƐƉůĂǇĞĚŚŝĚĚĞŶ ? ?,ĞŝĚĞŐŐer, 1986), it is necessary to show 
due reverence towards it (Gadamer, 1996). Rather than the locating of phenomena in simple 
formal models, there should be genuine effort to understand them, and openness to 
evaluating our opinions on the things on their own terms (Bernstein, 1982). Epoche or 
suspension consists of putting into brackets judgments, opinions and inherited scientific truth 
positions. The researcher is always cradled in a tradition, and it would be hypocritical to deny 
this and hide behind slogans of neutrality and objectivity in the name of science. Some of the 
 ‘ƉƵƌĞƌ ? ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐƚŝĐ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐ ŝŶ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ ĐůĂŝŵ  “ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? ? dŚŝƐ ƉƌŽƐĞůǇƚŝƐŵ  ?tŝůůŝĂŵs, 
2009) contributed to make a positivist cult (Chambers, 1993). Yet, knowledge is a construction 
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by the researcher (Tinker, 1998, 2001) who cannot be concealed from the process of its 
production as claimed by ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉƌŝƐƚŝŶĞ ?positivists. The researcher is the consciousness 
directing attention to the world. In doing so, the world becomes meaningful. This does not 
negate the value of openness to, and reverence towards, a phenomenon. The consciousness 
can strive to construct an authentic understanding of phenomena by striving to free itself, 
even in a relative and temporal, even momentary, sense, from the tradition by suspending its 
prejudices: 
 
What I considered to be my inherited structure of understanding, what I believed I had to 
carry out in this world, it seemed that I had to place all this in front of me and put it back 
into movement like an open worksite, awaiting acts (Desanti, 1994, p.20). 
  
The epoche constitutes the root of phenomenological analysis, a critical attitude expressing a 
reform of understanding (Husserl, 1992), which is a disengagement from the mode of mass 
belief and the taken-for-granted. The critical attitude for Husserl is the trial of placing the fate 
of the thing in suspense by learning to be patient and by letting experience emerge. For 
Husserl (1992), the epoche does not consist of abolishing knowledge, as this negation would be 
ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ  “ŶŽŶ-ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů ? ? /ƚ is rather an act of adjournment to avoid the pitfalls of the 
natural attitude (Husserl) or the objective thought (Merleau-Ponty), which prevent doubt and 
understanding. The natural attitude is the placing of the world as the absolute foundation for 
all truth (Housset, 2000). For Husserl (1998), empiricism (in the sense of Bernstein, 1976) is the 
first manifestation of the natural attitude. It reflects an absolute belief in the world as the 
totality of spatio-temporal events and denies for consciousness (the observer) any recognition 
or sense of personal space.  
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Another form of natural attitude is disguised under the spectre of intellectualism or Cartesian 
reflection (Merleau-Ponty, 1999). It is the a priori reflective analysis that breaks with the world 
itself and constitutes it by the operation of consciousness. Knowledge construction is here 
ostensibly undertaken in total disconnection from the world (Merleau-Ponty, 1999). 
Intellectualism formulates concepts, postulates and theories that are attached usually to a 
specific vision of the world, and naïvely remains caught up in the illusion that it can explain the 
world by an arrangement of these concepts. Its explanation evolves towards a possibility 
ĂůǁĂǇƐ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĞĚ ďǇ ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ? ĂŶĚ ŵĂǇ ŵŝƐƐ ƚŚĞ ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶ ĂƐ ĂŶ  “ŝŶĨŝŶŝƚĞ
ŝĚĞĂ ? ?/ƚŝƐ “a world-centred reflection, a truth as seen by the prisoner in the cave who prefers 
the shadows to which he is accustomed and who does not understand that they owe their 
existence to the light ? (Merleau-Ponty, 1999, p.52).  
 
The phenomenology of perception provides an escape from the idealism of intellectualism 
(rationalism), without falling into the naïve acceptance of the realism of empiricism 
(positivism) (Merleau-Ponty, 1999). If phenomenology is opposed to the absoluteness of the 
logic of naturalism, Husserl does not see it as exactly a return to the sceptical relativism (all 
truth is relative to the judging subject) of historicism attributed to Dilthey: 
 
Naturalists and historicists fight about Weltanschauung, and yet both are at work on 
different sides to misinterpret ideas as facts and to transform all reality, all life, into an 
incomƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝďůĞ ?ŝĚĞĂůĞƐƐĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶŽĨ ?ĨĂĐƚƐ ? ?dŚĞƐƵƉĞƌƐƚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĨĂĐƚŝƐĐŽŵŵŽŶƚŽ
them all (Husserl, 1998; p.79). 
 
The failure to suspend prejudices is illustrated in the case of mainstream U.S. accounting 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚďǇƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ?ƐƌŝŐŝĚĂŶĚƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĂůdemarcation of normative accounting from positive 
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accounting. The latter is deemed scientific whereas the former is deemed pseudo-scientific. 
This is a naïve characterization of research that may serve to ideologically buttress the 
mainstream research in certain contexts (see Chabrak, 2012).  
 
&ƌŽŵ ?dƌƵƚŚ ?ĂƐĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ?dƌƵƚŚ ?ĂƐĚŝƐƌƵƉƚŝŽŶ 
The natural attitude is the illusion of a truth existing outside of (realism/objectivism) or inside 
the mind (idealism/subjectivism). Phenomenology denounces both these dimensions. It is not 
concerned with the sterile debate on the subject/object relationship and a dispute between 
two perspectives characterised by the negation of their opposite. In his work on 
phenomenology, Husserl (1976) deplores that science and positivism makes men fetishists of 
facts who rarely ask themselves about the way they look at facts. With intentionality, 
phenomenology detaches itself from conventional conceptions of philosophy as a theory of 
knowledge  W a conception based on the dual opposition of subject and object (Depraz, 1998). 
Phenomenology as an ontology advocates breaking with the conception of the world as 
independent of the mind, and of things that are what they seem to be. In real-life experience, 
phenomenology sĞĞŬƐ ĨŽƌ  “the unity of a meaning which is prior to any sterile dualism ?
(Depraz, 1998, p.3). The world takes on a meaning only for consciousness and consciousness 
only for the world. This implies the advent of a joint world and mind out of the various actions 
accomplished by being-in-the-world. Consciousness is neither the reflection nor the mirror of 
the world. Husserl suggests that the world should be comprehended by seeing in it the mark of 
our own structure. It is a break with the conception of Man as reduced vis-à-vis truth so that 
truth is only seen as accessed in an unmediated way. It is the consecration of Man as subject 
because truth cannot be revealed on its own. This is a new way of thinking about the type of 
otherness of the world, without eliminating it (Housset, 2000). For Bernstein (1982), following 
Gadamer, the meaning of what we seek to understand is not self-contained, it does not exist 
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an sich, a posited object as it is in itself. The meaning is only realized through the happening of 
understanding. 
 
With reference to accounting, for Hines (1988), prior to our conceptual schemes, there is just a 
jumble of things: uninteresting because no theory of truth or of knowledge is implied; there is 
emptiness (McKernan, 2007). The idea of objective reality in this regard becomes problematic 
and undesirable when it exerts an external pressure on researchers (and beyond) in the guise 
of a major step towards better coincidence of truth and reality with accounting. 
 
In his paper, McKernan (2007) criticizes ^ŚĂƉŝƌŽ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ ǀŝƐ-à-vis 
external reality. Following Searle, Shapiro (1997) argues that some reality exists out there 
independently, but does not make any epistemological claim about how or how well an 
observer might come to know or perceive that reality (p. 168). He goes on to argue that 
accounting does not make the world, it makes a description of it, and some financial reporting 
models are better than others in describing some features of this external reality. Is it possible 
to specify convincingly how things are in the world prior to accounting descriptions (McKernan, 
2007)? Can the financial reporting model be a separate conceptual scheme supposed to 
represent an external reality? Rather, is it not just a suburb of the universal scheme, our 
theorizing of the world, shaped jointly by the world and our interest in the world (Davidson, 
1997b; see McKernan, 2007, p. 169)?  
 
The simple idea that is associated with much of the conventional accounting literature about 
the possible ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨĂŶ “ŽƉƚŝŵĂů ? ? “ŚŝŐŚƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŽĨĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚůĞĂĚƚŽ
the best translation of economic reality becomes a myth. As explained by Varela et al. (1991), 
the enactive paradigm in cognitive science explicitly calls into question the prevalent 
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assumption that cognition consists of the representation of a world that is independent of our 
ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚƵĂů ĂŶĚ ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐ ? dŚĞ ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ŽĨ  “ĞŶĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ŽƵƚůŝŶĞƐ ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ Ă ǀŝĞǁ ŽĨ
ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ĂƐ  “ĞŵďŽĚŝĞĚ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ƐŝƚƵĂƚĞƐ ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶǁŝthin the context of evolutionary 
ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? /ŶĚĞĞĚ ? ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐ ŶŽƚ ŝŶ ŽƉƚŝŵĂů ĂĚĂƉƚĂƚŝŽŶďƵƚ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ŝŶ  “ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ĚƌŝĨƚ ? ?
Hence, cognition has no ultimate foundation or ground beyond its history of embodiment: 
 “ƚŚĞŬĞǇƉŽŝŶƚ ?ƚŚĞŶ ?ŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĞƐďrings forth and specifies its own domain of problems 
ƚŽďĞƐŽůǀĞĚďǇƐĂƚŝƐĨŝĐŝŶŐ ?ƚŚŝƐĚŽŵĂŝŶĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĞǆŝƐƚ “ŽƵƚƚŚĞƌĞ ?ŝŶĂŶĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚĂĐƚƐ
as a landing pad for organisms that somehow drop or parachute into the world. Instead, living 
beings and their environments stand in relation to each other, through mutual specification or 
codetermination. Thus, what we describe as environmental regularities [economic reality 
which researchers strive to reflect through accounting categories] are not external features 
that have been internalized, as representationalism and adaptationism both assume. 
Environmental regularities are the result of a conjoint history, a congruence that unfolds from 
a long history of codetermination, the organism is both the subject and the object of 
ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?sĂƌĞůĂet al., 1991, p. 199). 
 
Investigated in the name of representationalism and correspondentism implied by the notion 
of external reality in Shapiro (McKernan, 2007), the inclusion of stock option compensation in 
accounts is actually an example of deeply ideological social practice. For Berenson (2004), the 
use of stock options was the irrational driver of the stock bubble of the late 1990s in the U.S. 
Ravenscroft and Williams (2009) explain how the FASB adopted SFAS 123R to better reflect the 
economic consequences of this practice. To increase transparency, the standard requires firms 
to report the fair value of the options at the grant date. Since these options are not traded on 
the market, the Black WScholes or Lattice option pricing models are applied to derive the fair 
value. The application requires numerous assumptions, including about the functioning of 
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markets. For Ravenscroft and Williams (2009), both models emerge from the imaginary world 
of neoclassical economics: accountants accepted this world so they have the responsibility to 
make it real. The adoption of the useful information metaphor and the acceptance of its 
underlying presupposition that financial reporting quality is related to its correspondence to an 
objective reality overshadow the instrumental role of accounting in naturalizing neoliberalism 
(Ravenscroft and Williams, 2009). Positive accounting theorists with commitment to neo-
classical economics and their predecessors from the Chicago School continue to claim their 
approach as a disinterested and objective inquiry and as the only rigorous scientific procedure 
leading to correspondence with mind-independent reality and faithful representation of it. In 
doing so, they oriented accounting practices presupposing new rationales to sustain the 
authority of the type of capitalistic order they promote. 
 
^ŝŶĐĞƚŚĞ “ďĞ-ŝŶŐ ?ŽĨĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐĂƐŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƐĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨƌĞĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚƚŚĞ notion 
of  “ďƐŽůƵƚĞdƌƵƚŚ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĚĞĞƉůǇƌŽŽƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞtĞƐƚĞƌŶƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐ
to conceive accounting practices and institutions differently, it is crucial to shake the 
ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  “dƌƵƚŚ ? ? dŚŝƐ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ĚŽŶĞ ďǇ ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  “ďĞŝŶŐ ? ?
Rorty (1998) argues that the Western rationalistic tradition is a secularized version of the 
fundamental style of Christian Theology  W ǁŚĂƚ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌĐĂůůƐ “ŽŶƚŽ-ƚŚĞŽůŽŐǇ ? (Rorty, 1991). 
As explained by Laughlin (1995), this tradition expands from the dominant Christian 
ƵŶĚĞƌƉŝŶŶŝŶŐŽĨ'ŽĚ ?ƐŽƌĚĞƌŝŶŐŽĨĂƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůǁŽƌůĚǁĂŝƚŝŶŐƚŽďĞĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů
processes, to the more agnostic position and division between the European rationalists such 
as Descartes (who had a final recourse to God), Spinoza and Leibniz. These rationalists thought 
that an absolute description of the world uncontaminated by the experience of any observer 
was possible through reason. The English empiricists such as Locke, Berkeley and Hume argued 
that our ideas are the outcome of what comes to us via our senses. The division between the 
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two traditions was resolved in one way by ŽŵƚĞ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵ ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ in response to <ĂŶƚ ?Ɛ
idealism and its inherent subjectivism. Positivism is a tightly defined rational, deductive process 
coupled with similarly clear rules on how to observe the empirical world, where subjectivity has 
no part in its make-up (Laughlin, 1995, p.73).  A pristine positivism is rooted in human desire 
for certainty and a fascination for absolute truth. The idea of absolute truth of reality  W as it is 
in itself  W is deeply preoccupying as we explained previously. In the name of this truth, 
instruments of emancipation, over the course of time, turned into instruments of repression 
(Rorty, 1998, pp. 76-8).  
 
For Heidegger, truth  W or aletheia (un-hiddenness)  W is the appearing, un-covering and 
disclosing of things  W as the things that they are  W within a horizontal (or surface-level) setting 
(Malpas, 1992, p.267).5 Truth is here the opening-up of the horizon of possibilities, 
engendering the primacy of phenomenology as critical ontology. It is the revealing of the 
 “ďĞŝŶŐ ? ďǇ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŽŶĐĞĂůŝŶŐ ? ŽĨ ŽŶĞ  “ďĞ-ŝŶŐ ? from which it comes. It is a complex processual 
dynamic of understanding: 
  
Truth reflects the dynamic of understanding: we are wrenched from our immersion in a 
project by the disruption of that project only to submerge once more as the project is 
reconstituted or a new project arises. Such immersion is itself a concealing of possibilities 
(Malpas, 1992, p.268). 
 
Only aletheia manifested in opening-up and freeing-up can maintain possibilities for 
understanding. The articulation of a complex processual dynamic helps to explain Heidegger's 
claim that Dasein is "equally in truth and in untruth", and that problematisation reflects the 
                                                          
5 In modern everyday Greek, the meaning of the word is similar to truth in modern English. Through a 
hermeneutics of ancient texts, Heidegger invests it with a richer meaning in his analysis. 
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competent behaviour of Dasein. Truth is not conceived as correspondence or as the related 
notion of coherence; rather Truth is something like the idea of the constant process of 
disruption, in which new possibilities of meaning are revealed/concealed (see Malpas, 1992). 
&Žƌ ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ƚŚŝƐ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  “dƌƵƚŚ ? ŚĞůƉƐ ƚŽ ƐŚĂŬĞ ŽĨĨ tradition instead of its 
appropriation (see Kolb, 1986; Krell, 1992, 2006; Ward, 1995; Thomson, 2011).  It is consistent 
with a responsibility to the other. 
 
Truth as disruption has crucial implications for accounting research and indeed the practices 
and discourse of accounting, for a long time conceived on the basis of truth as 
correspondence. The first implication is the rejection of  “ďĞ-ing ?ŶĞƵƚƌĂů (in the sense criticised 
by Tinker, 1991) in accounting research and practice. The second implication is the need to 
explore how accounting practice and economic decisions are all embedded in social life. This 
understanding may help highlight areas of ƚŽĚĂǇ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞĐƵƌrently too much in 
the shadows. The truth as disruption could render voice to what has been silenced because of 
the hegemony of a certain type of economic thought. According to Cooper et al. (2010), 
ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞ ůŝǀŝŶŐ ŝŶ  “ƚŚĞ ĂƵĚŝƚ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ? ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ǀŝŽůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ĂďƵƐĞƐ ? ƵŶĨĂŝƌŶĞƐƐ ĂŶĚ
ƵƐƵƌƉĂƚŝŽŶĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐŝŶĐĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ ?ƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ĨŽƌŵƐĂƌĞƵŶĂďůĞ ƚŽŵĂŬĞ ƚŚĞŵǀŝƐŝďůĞ ?dŚĞǇ
ignore social imperatives and leave no space for rendering income and wealth inequalities 
discernible. The break with the dominant theories and the return to phenomenology helps 
researchers to see how accounting is relatively silent or soundless on these topics. Accounting 
has currently little to say on how corporate behaviour damages lives and dignity and the social 
and ecological environment. Accounting is not playing a very useful educative role in raising 
ƚŚĞĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐŽĨĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐƚŽŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?ŶĞǁƉƌŽũĞĐƚŽĨ “ďĞ-ŝŶŐ ?ŽĨ
accounting could open new avenues for researchers and practitioners to study other issues, 
instead of the body of artefacts and pseudo facts that dominate the current research agenda 
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(Chabrak and Gendron, 2015). 
 
The issues elaborated here in relation to phenomenology as ontology from a perspective 
drawing from Heidegger  W and the advances thereby reflected in intentionality, epoche and 
truth as disruption  W have significance not only for the critique of conventional accounting 
research but also for much interpretive and critical research. In relation to intentionality, some 
ostensibly anti-positivist researchers appear to be still sublimated by the myth of objectivity in 
that they are unable to assume intentionality in the production of their research. 
Consequently, they do not recognize the significance of the act of epoche of their natural 
attitude in conducting research. They still share the prejudices of the inherited categories of 
their own research tradition. Also, some critical and interpretive researchers substantively 
eschew the notion of pursuing truth as disruption and hence underplay the critical possibilities 
 W involving a new way of appreciating consciousness and the otherness of the world. 
 
Articulation in terms of the responsibility to otherness 
The insights can be interpreted in terms of emphasising a heightened sensitivity to otherness, 
which has particular characteristics in Heidegger (a face-to-face quality, an experience of 
otherness), that has to be somehow balanced against the politico-ethical responsibility to act. 
Without this balance or fruitful tension ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐĂĚĂŶŐĞƌŽĨĂƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐ  ‘ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?ƚŽĞ ?Ő ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂ 
arrangements that are shot through with oppressions, neglect, marginalization, exclusions, 
suffocation of diversity and disrespect: instead of seeing the pursuit of justice as a ceaseless 
open-ended, multi-dimensional and complex endeavour (White, 1991). Heidegger here 
arguably still adds something to postmodern philosophy in seeking a continual reaffirmation of 
a responsibility to otherness. Heidegger appears to be committed to the idea of experiencing 
or seeking to experience otherness that allows the other to be in its difference: given the 
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contradictory nature of the commitment it implies a kind of balancing or mixing, a state of 
ambivalence or ambiguity. But this effort, a deepening of learning from facing the world 
differently, may have positive effects on modern lives: it can embrace fostering otherness 
beyond tolerating it (White, 1991). Reflexivity should be concerned with responsibility to 
otherness as should the search for the truth as disruption. In mobilising accounting and in 
necessarily being concerned to control, we need to at the same time be thus more richly 
informed and to reflect this. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCOUNTING RESEARCH: A SUMMARY 
To mobilize truth as a disruptive endeavour, it is crucial to find mechanisms preventing new 
ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌŝĞƐĨƌŽŵďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐ  “ƐĞĚŝŵĞŶƚĞĚŚĂďŝƚƵƐ ? ?,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŽĨƚŚĞ “ďĞŝŶŐ ? ?ƚŚĞ
 “ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ŽĨdasein ? ĂŶĚ ƚƌƵƚŚ ĂƐ  “aletheia ? ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐ ŚŽǁ ƚŽ ůŝďĞƌĂƚĞ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ĨƌŽŵ
the cŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂů ĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ Žƌ  “ďĞ-ŝŶŐ ? of accounting as neutral but not to take over-
ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚ ƌĞĨƵŐĞ ŝŶ ĂŶǇ ŽƚŚĞƌ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ  “ďĞ-ŝŶŐ ? Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƐŬ ŽĨ ƚŚĂƚ ďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ 
 “sedimented habitus ?.   
 
This paper calls critical accounting researchers to avoid being ŶĂƌƌŽǁĞĚŝŶĂƚǇƉĞŽĨ “ďĞ-ŝŶŐ ?Ăƚ
the risk of not promoting, albeit cautiously and pragmatically, an alternative accounting model 
and practice. Some critical and interpretive researchers seem to be more devoted to establish 
the veracity of the theories they cherish rather than being driven by the concern to work on 
and change the phenomena they explore. Unconsciously, such approaches risk becoming 
confined in a certain view of the world and wallow in a natural attitude towards it, in a way 
that is congruent with their more positivistic and conventional rivals. Their contribution  W 
which more generally is weakened by offering opponents some means to defeat their project  W 
risks becoming just the shoring up of a sedimented habitus. 
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To keep on ƚŚĞƉĂƚŚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞ “ďĞŝŶŐ ? ? “ďĞ-ŝŶŐƐ ?ďĞǇŽŶĚalready manifest positions should 
be explored, examined, questioned and transformed. Hence, we should apply systematic 
ĚŽƵďƚĂŶǇƚŝŵĞĂŶĞǁ “ďĞ-ŝŶŐ ?ŝƐƌĞĂĐŚĞĚ that threatens to become the established and taken-
for-granted phenomenon. Understanding becomes pre-understanding so that it is never 
ingrained (Housset, 2000). The quest for possibilities leads the researcher to problematise 
reality continuously. Understanding is possible through the dialectic between the tradition and 
the questioning researcher (the appreciation here of positive dimensions of the prior context 
resonates with Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, see Gallhofer and Haslam, 2017). Prejudice is only of 
substantive value when there is the possibility to evaluate it and revolutionize or radically 
transform it. 
 
Owing to the act of suspension of the prejudice (which does not cancel it but places it on hold), 
ƚŚĞ “Ğ-ŝŶŐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĂƉƌŽũĞĐƚŽĨ “ƚŚĞĞŝŶŐ ? ? ?ŵĂŬĞƐĂŶƵƚƚĞƌĂŶĐ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚŽĨ
pre-ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƐĞƚ ĨŽƌƚŚ Ă ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ŽĨ  “Ğ-ŝŶŐ ? ? dŚĞ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ĐĂŶ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ŚĞƌ
judgmental capacities on the objects of knowledge relatively freely and understanding springs 
forth as the phenomenon becomes unveiled. The researcher in this case is not proving her 
understandings as a concern for proof is not directing her investigation. Findings do not 
consecrate pre-understanding and prejudices (Heidegger, 1986; Chabrak, 2005). 
 
 “Like travellers, we return home with new experiences. Even if we emigrate and never 
return, we still can never wholly forget ? (Gadamer, 1996). 
  
A return to tradition, to prejudice, is inevitable after the first tentative move towards a new 
project of understanding. Once the act of epoche (suspension) is suspended, a critical and 
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evaluating enterprise begins to liberate the researcher from unreflective moments, inherited 
from tradition, which prevent any understanding. Gadamer, a disciple of Heidegger, notes that 
the mistake of historicism and objectivism is to try to reduce or even destroy, as distinct from 
appreciating, the prejudices. Everyone in the world has prejudices or prejudicial interest, by 
which tacit power directs the mind of the observer towards the solution of problems. The aim 
of objectivism is to ostensibly shut off from ourselves all presuppositions. Those prejudices 
 “constitute our common life-world from which is enabled the whole process by which scientific 
knowledge emerges and grows ? ?>ĂǀŽŝĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? P
 
Does understanding in the human sciences understand itself correctly when it relegates 
the whole of its own historicality to the position of prejudices from which we must free 
ŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ?KƌĚŽĞƐ ?ƵŶƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞĚƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉ ?ƐŚĂƌĞŵŽƌe than it realizes with that naïve 
openness and reflection in which traditions live and the past is present...If we disregard 
ourselves in this way, we have no historical horizon (Gadamer, 1996, p.327). 
  
Understanding is possible through a permanent and never-ĞŶĚŝŶŐ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ ŽĨ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
present, and the application of the meaning discovered for ŽŶĞ ?ƐƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?hŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŝƐ
the art of emptying our full cups by enabling tradition to become experience, and of remaining 
open to the quest for truth. Tradition should never be reified as something simply given 
(Bernstein, 1982). It should be evaluated and even radically changed. 
 
Researchers here inspired by the focal phenomenon may realize the gap between how they 
understand accounting through traditional thinking and the imperatives for a break with 
corporate and problematic hegemonic capture to render, for instance, more social 
accountability. They become aware of their role in preserving economic capital and financial 
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 ‘ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐ ? ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ŽĨ ĐĂƉŝƚĂů and a problematic socio-political order. They 
become conscious of their doxic submission to a certain capitalistic and problematic socio-
political order. They can appreciate how accounting income, in its current form, encourages 
their tendency to accept human capital exploitation and natural capital depletion alongside 
their disagreeing with any attempt to restore justice (Cooper et al., 2010). Such discovery 
carries the potential to initiate a new departure for accounting research and practice. 
Accounting could encompass the political action to provoke social change towards 
inclusiveness and sustainability by ensuring information to raise a new conception of 
accountability and by playing an educational role to help citizens address crucial issues. At the 
same time our approach here suggests the need for a critical reflexivity and constant 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐŽĨďĞŝŶŐƐĂƐƚŚĞǇĞŵĞƌŐĞĂŶĚďĞĐŽŵĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶƚŝĂů ?ŶĚǀĞƌǇŬĞǇŚĞƌĞŝƐ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?Ɛ
reflection on what can be understood in terms of a responsibility to otherness that somehow 
ought to balance the responsibility to act. 
 
Accounting, in its currently dominant manifestation, tells more than an impoverished 
economic fable about corporate performance. For Merino (1993), quoting Dewey and Tufts 
(1908, 1922), by encouraging ƚŚĞĨĂůƐĞĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ “ŵŽŶĞƚĂƌǇŐain should be the object of 
Ăůů ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ  “ĂƌƚĞĨĂĐƚ ? ƉƌŽĨŝƚtends to create incentives for extractive 
logics, exploitation, dubious management practices, discord and social as well as 
environmental disasters. dŽĚĂǇ ? ƚŚĞ /^ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ ŐŝǀĞƐ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐ ƚŽ ŝƚƐ
serving of investors in relation to the construct of shareholder value maximization. In any case, 
the emphasis and the broader mix of interests to which it relates (see Tinker, 1985; Gallhofer 
and Haslam, 2007) betrays a narrow and problematic orientation. As a technology that in some 
ways attempts to make market control possible over organizations and subsequently all 
human life today, accounting is questionable. If the notion of accounting for human rights 
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(Cooper et al., 2010; Gallhofer et al., 2011; McPhail and McKernan, 2011; McPhail and 
Ferguson, 2016), inclusiveness and sustainability is desired, a radically different form of 
accounting should be developed. We can here see that the implications for accounting 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞǆƚĞŶĚďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞĂŶĚĂƌĞŶĂƚŽƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌĂƌĞŶĂƐŽĨĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ ?Ɛ
mobilization. 
 
In summary, our contribution here, drawing on insights from Heidegger and other 
phenomenologists, is manifold. We emphasise the importance of recognising the validity and 
value of driven research that is constantly challenging  W initially especially influential 
phenomena ossified as tradition - and in regard to being attentive to uncovering possibilities 
through a deep questioning as to the meaning of accounting and its role. At the same time, we 
endorse a deep reflexivity that seeks to problematize the mind-set of technical control, that 
sees the valuable in the existing and that has a heightened sense of responsibility to the other. 
This implies a deep concern to arrive at authentic understanding in the quest for authenticity  W 
being aware of prejudice and seeking to be open. These dimensions come together in notions 
such as seeking a disruptive kind of truth, whereby new possibilities of meaning are revealed, 
albeit meanings are always acknowledged as partial. Overall there is a mixing or balancing of 
the politico-ethical responsibility to act with the responsibility to otherness. And the 
implication of the insights is the advocacy of a cautious pragmatism in an emancipatory 
approach to the accounting phenomenon. 
 
Crucial moments are when researchers can, as it were, virtually bracket tradition (as Husserl 
puts it), listen to the phenomenon and potentially adjust their understanding. An approach 
based on phenomenology of the Dasein ŝŶƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚĨŽƌƚŚĞ “ďĞŝŶŐ ? ?,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŵĂŬĞƐ
new understandings of accounting and its role possible. Heidegger ?Ɛ philosophical writings add 
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a number of insights from a critical perspective. While recognizing an indispensable need in 
our context for calculative thought and technical control, in research and in practice, 
Heidegger encourages a basic questioning that is of relevance not least in relation to global 
and ecological issues  W it can be translated as a heightened responsibility to the other (White, 
1991).6 Heidegger encourages reflexivity (a reflexivity that is also attentive to the value of that 
existing) and caution while being open to new possibilities (Kolb, 1986). No one can be spared 
the weight of the world. But from driven activity two types of researchers are born. The first is 
 “ŶĂƌĐŝƐƐŝƐƚŝĐ ? ĂŶĚmerely prolongs and backs up her knowledge at the expense of 
understanding. The researcher deploys a calculative technical control approach that might 
reflect an un-thought practice, serving an empty subjectivity (Heidegger, 1966; Kolb, 1986, p. 
120). The researcher here is unable to listen, to see and to adjust what he or she unconsciously 
internalizes via affiliation to dominant disciplines. Through accounting standards, numbers and 
concepts, the researcher reinforces objective structures of the system, whether affiliated to 
neo-classical economics or to alternative, ostensibly critical forms. The second is concerned 
with accounting, the phenomenon, and its impact on our society. The researcher is aware that 
 ‘ďĞŝŶŐ ?ĐĂŶďĞƐĞŝǌĞĚŝŶĂůŽŶŐũŽƵƌŶĞǇŽĨƌĞǀĞĂůŝŶŐĂŶĚĐŽŶĐĞĂůŝŶŐŽĨ “ďĞ-ŝŶŐƐ ? ?EĞǁƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ
ŽĨ “ďĞ-ŝŶŐƐ ?ĂƌĞƌĂŝƐĞĚďƵƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŶĞǀĞƌƐŽůŝĚŝĨŝĞĚĂŶĚƐƚĂďŝůŝǌĞĚ ?dŚĞǇĂƌĞƐƵďŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽƚhe 
continuous scrutiny of experience and transformed ŝŶƚŚĞĞŶĚůĞƐƐƉĂƚŚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞ “ďĞŝŶŐ ? ? 
 
                                                          
6 ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƐĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐǇĂŶĚŽĨŚŽǁƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚŽƵŐŚƚĐĂŶďĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚǀŝƐ-à-vis 
co-ordinates set out by Plato, which encouraged control thinking, helps us question the mindset of 
technical control. 
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